Providing comfort to Iraq's Kurds: forming a de facto relationship by Gomes, Alapaki F.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection
2016-03
Providing comfort to Iraq's Kurds: forming a de facto relationship
Gomes, Alapaki F.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
PROVIDING COMFORT TO IRAQ’S KURDS: FORMING 








Thesis Advisor:  James Russell 
Second Reader: Ryan Gingeras 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB 
No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
PROVIDING COMFORT TO IRAQ’S KURDS: FORMING A DE FACTO 
RELATIONSHIP 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)  Alapaki F. Gomes
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     




MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis seeks to determine how the United States has become the de facto security guarantor to 
Iraq’s Kurds. The development of a formal relationship between the American government and Iraq’s 
Kurdish population began as a response to a humanitarian crisis after the First Gulf War. The response 
mission was named Operation Provide Comfort. Though not intended to take sides, Operation Provide 
Comfort was a direct intervention into a conflict between the Iraqi state and Iraq’s Kurds—one that 
provided political space for the Kurds to pursue autonomy at Baghdad’s expense. Operation Provide 
Comfort was a shift in American policy on Iraq, made more prominent in comparison to American policy 
only three years earlier that declined to respond to allegations of genocide among these same Kurds by the 
same Iraqi state. 
This thesis recounts a brief history of Iraq’s Kurds and of American policy regarding their 
liberation movement, and applies the framework of three prominent international relations  
theories—liberal internationalism, constructivism and realism—to analyze Operation Provide Comfort as 
a U.S. foreign policy decision. This thesis determines that all three frameworks explain aspects of the 
mission, though the application of each theory exposes Iraq’s Kurdish question as an ongoing 
shortcoming in U.S. foreign policy. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS





















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Alapaki F. Gomes 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 





















Mohammed M. Hafez, Ph.D. 
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




This thesis seeks to determine how the United States has become the de facto 
security guarantor to Iraq’s Kurds. The development of a formal relationship between the 
American government and Iraq’s Kurdish population began as a response to a 
humanitarian crisis after the First Gulf War. The response mission was named Operation 
Provide Comfort. Though not intended to take sides, Operation Provide Comfort was a 
direct intervention into a conflict between the Iraqi state and Iraq’s Kurds—one that 
provided political space for the Kurds to pursue autonomy at Baghdad’s expense. 
Operation Provide Comfort was a shift in American policy on Iraq, made more prominent 
in comparison to American policy only three years earlier that declined to respond to 
allegations of genocide among these same Kurds by the same Iraqi state. 
This thesis recounts a brief history of Iraq’s Kurds and of American policy 
regarding their liberation movement, and applies the framework of three prominent 
international relations theories—liberal internationalism, constructivism and realism
—to analyze Operation Provide Comfort as a U.S. foreign policy decision. This 
thesis determines that all three frameworks explain aspects of the mission, though the 
application of each theory exposes Iraq’s Kurdish question as an ongoing shortcoming in 
U.S. foreign policy. 
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What explains the evolving U.S. security commitment to the Kurds in northern 
Iraq? This thesis explores this relationship and its history, focusing on the period at the 
end of the First Gulf War and the execution Operation Provide Comfort during the 
George H. W. Bush administration. More simply put, this thesis asks:  How and why has 
American policy developed toward Iraq’s Kurds? What have been the drivers behind 
Washington’s recent, but profound, interest in Kurdish affairs? Prior to 1991, the U.S. 
government had very little official interaction with Iraqi Kurds. By the time of the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. government had developed robust dealings 
directly with leadership from Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional government 
(KRG). As the war progressed, U.S. policy makers openly courted the KRG to become 
regional partners and help provide stability in Iraqi. Though the KRG is officially 
considered an entity subject to central Iraqi authority today and therefore not entitled to 
separate policy action, recent regional security issues have once again highlighted the 
exceptional place that Iraqi Kurds hold within U.S. policy considerations.1 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH  
United States policy regarding Iraq has been at the center of America’s greater 
Middle East policy for nearly a quarter century, a period that spanned over a decade of 
low-intensity conflict bracketed by two separate wars. One stated aim of U.S. policy 
during this period was to avoid the destruction of the Iraqi state into successor entities 
that would likely be premised on ethnic or sectarian divisions. As the U.S. policy on Iraq 
shifted from containment to regime change, American leadership remained committed to 
maintaining the Iraqi state as an intact political entity.2 U.S. actions, however, amounted 
                                                 
1 Scott Atran and Douglas M. Stone, “The Kurds’ Heroic Stand Against ISIS,” New York Times, 
March 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/opinion/the-kurds-heroic-stand-against-
isis.html?_r=0; See also Julian Pecquet, “Defense bill recognizes Iraq’s Kurdish, Sunni militias as a 
‘country,’’’ Al Monitor, April 27, 2015, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/28/defense-bill-
recognizes-iraqs-kurdish-sunni-militias-as-a-country.  
2 President George H. W. Bush statement during April 22, 1991 press conference, quoted in Lokman I. 
Meho, The Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary Sourcebook, (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 2004), 559. 
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to a de facto policy focused on a sub-national partner rather than with the national 
government, infringing directly on Iraqi national sovereignty. By the time the U.S. 
prepared for invasion in 2003, U.S. policy actions had transformed America into the 
guarantor of the de facto autonomy of the KRG.   
The divide between stated policy goals and executed policy actions reflects the 
open-ended struggle between U.S. strategic priorities and a rapidly changing strategic 
environment. The case of the Iraqi Kurds offers an ongoing opportunity to consider in 
microcosm how international politics, domestic security concerns, and a shifting 
understanding of the United States’ roles and responsibilities impact the formation and 
execution of American policy. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
During the period under review, three main schools of international relations (IR) 
thought were arguably reflected in American policy decisions: realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism. Through the prism of each of these families of theories and their various 
distillations, scholars attempt to provide an understanding of a state’s decision making 
process in the international system in order to produce a theoretical template for policy 
makers to exploit at an advantage. Though the divisions between schools of thought are 
never as concrete in practice as in theory, a brief survey of IR theory provides a 
framework from which to approach the formation of a state’s preferences, goals, and 
intentions. 
Realist thought is premised on the international system being anarchic, with 
individual states vying for advantage against each other in terms of a balance of power.3 
States are the functional units with the international system with no level of authority 
above states to which any individual unit could request redress of grievances. This 
condition results in states having to be self-reliant in terms of security and survival. States 
jockey for advantage with regard to this power balance, expressed in both potential 
                                                 
3 See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
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(economic/demographic) and tangible (military) terms,4 and national interests are defined 
as those things that build or erode state power.5   
The liberal family of theories’ tenets generally advocate for international 
institutions as the means to achieve order in the international system. State preferences, 
economic interdependence and political affinity all work to foster or hinder cooperation 
at the international level.6 Liberal internationalism, with a pedigree traced back to 
Wilsonian thought, draws upon liberalism’s reliance on international institutions and adds 
a normative component, seeking to organize power “in ways conducive to the realization 
of particular liberal principles.”7 Among just a few of these principles liberal 
internationalists seek to promote are democracy, free markets, universal human rights, 
cooperative security, and rule of law.8 The liberal family of theories provides for non-
state actors, like international non-governmental organizations, as well as sub-state actors 
that can affect foreign policy choices based on domestic politics.9 
Constructivists argue that goals and identities are social constructs and not 
assumed, as in Realist and liberal thought. Relationships between actors are informed by 
created identities and norms that define what each actor does and wants to do. Rather 
than assume that the international system is anarchic by definition, constructivists argue 
                                                 
4 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wolforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: 
Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000–2001), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626705.  
5 See Hans J. Morgenthau Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York: Random House, 1972). 
6 See  Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51, no. 4 (Autumn, 1997),  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703498; Bruce Russett, 
Bruce and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International 
Organizations (New York: Norton Publishers, 2001); and  Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown Publishers, 1997). 
7 Ian Clark and Christian Reus-Smit, “Liberal Internationalism, the Practice of Special Responsibilities 
and Evolving Politics of the Security Council,” International Politics, 50, No.1 (2013): 40, 
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v50/n1/abs/ip201227a.html.  
8 G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World 
Order,” Perspectives on Politics 7, No. 1 (March 2009): 71, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40407217.  
9 Remi Maier-Rigaud, “International Organizations as Corporate Actors: Agency and Emergence in 
Theories of International Relations,” Max Planck Institute, February 2008: 21–23, 
https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2008_07online.pdf; Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One 
World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy, No. 110 (Spring 1998): 34–37, http://www.jstor.org/stable/
1149275.  
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that the system is created by complex learning as a result of interactions, and therefore 
need not be necessarily combative or negative.10 
Foreign policy analysis, a subset of IR theory, is another means with which to 
examine formation of foreign policy. Graham Allison, a leading proponent, offers three 
foreign policy decision making models: the rational actor model, the organizational 
process model, and the governmental politics model.11 Students are likely most familiar 
Model I, the rational actor model, in which those who make decisions and propose policy 
do so with a defined set of options and goals in mind. Model II analyzes organizational 
culture to reveal how entrenched group practices and ideologies can affect foreign policy. 
Model III does a similar analysis on decision makers and stake-holders within the 
decision-making apparatus of government. 
The subject to which these theoretical lenses will be applied is United States 
policy with regard to the Iraqi Kurds. Prior to the First Gulf War, American interest in the 
Kurdish people was only as a subset of U.S. policy toward states within the region. The 
U.S. government was far more interested in the risks that Kurds posed to local and 
regional stability, or how they might serve U.S. efforts toward non-proliferation of 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.12 Outside of such concerns, however, the 
U.S. government chose to treat the Kurds as a domestic issue within their states of 
residence, not as a separate issue that required its own policy. This convention to 
maintain foreign policy as a function between states without interference in domestic 
affairs has practical use in the international arena: it legitimizes the current nation-state 
system and provides a measure of protection for individual state sovereignty.  
                                                 
10 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–94, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858.  
11 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(New York: Addison-Wesley Educational, 1999), 5–8. 
12 Although members of Congress issued statements condemning chemical attacks conducted by the 
Iraqi military during the Anfal campaign against Iraq’s Kurdish citizens, potential human rights violations 
were coopted into arguments for economic sanctions as a response to prevent the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, rather than as a call to relieve human suffering. See Meho, Documentary Sourcebook, 
37–62. 
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When the United States began Operation Provide Comfort to protect the Kurds 
after the First Gulf War, American policy in Iraq officially became focused at the sub-
national level. U.S. commitment to the protection of Iraqi Kurds, in the form of “no-fly 
zones,” light infantry units and humanitarian aid, shaped the American post-war 
relationship with Iraq and further drove American policy. It also represented a break from 
the United Nations (UN) charter regarding UN intervention into a sovereign state’s 
domestic affairs.13 Operation Provide Comfort provided the initial justification for an 
ongoing U.S. military engagement after the war’s end; although it was an intervention 
initially predicated on averting humanitarian disaster, some of Operation Provide 
Comfort’s tools were subsequently continued in Operation Northern Watch and 
employed to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq.14 
Foreign policy discourse regarding Iraq’s Kurds during the periods under study 
tended to reflect America’s focus on larger policy goals and only addressed the 
awareness of who the Kurds were in pursuit of these objectives. In the period prior to the 
First Gulf War, Iraq’s Kurds were considered in terms of how their actions would affect 
U.S. regional allies, or as evidence of the threat presented by the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction.15 During the buildup to the Gulf War, Iraq’s Kurds served as 
justification for military use of force. After the war, discussions on Kurds in U.S. foreign 
policy were inextricably tied to the impacts of the U.S.-led coalition’s humanitarian 
intervention on the international stage and state sovereignty. Even as U.S. regional policy 
shifted to a post-Cold War strategy of the dual containment of Iraq and Iran during the 
                                                 
13 United Nations, United Nations Charter, Article 7 para. 2, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-
nations/index.html.  
14 President George H. W. Bush statement during April 22, 1991 press conference, quoted in Meho, 
Documentary Sourcebook, 558–59. 
15 Ibid., 52–56. 
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Clinton administration, the Kurds remained central to discourse on international law and 
humanitarian war.16 
As the United States became more interested in Hussein’s removal, foreign policy 
discussion on Kurds and their potential roles followed suit. When support for the 
coalition enforcement of no-fly zones waned, the United States was in need of 
alternatives.17 After the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998, Iraqi Kurds, as an 
opposition group and part of the Iraqi National Congress, were seen as an option to 
achieve the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.18 In the buildup to invasion in 2003 and 
afterward, the burgeoning U.S. relationship with the Kurds offered the means to replace 
the dictator with a plural democracy.19 In the aftermath of U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, 
                                                 
16 Howard Adelman, “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurdish Refugees,” 
Public Affairs Quarterly 6, No. 1 (January 1992), http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435797; See also Mona 
Fixdal and Dan Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War,” Mershon International Studies Review 
42, no. 2 (November 1998), http://www.jstor.org/stable/254418;  Adam Roberts, “Humanitarian War: 
Military Intervention and Human Rights,” International Affairs 69, No. 3 (July 1993), http://www.jstor.org/
stable/2622308; Ronald Ofteringer and Ralf Backer, “A Republic of Statelessness: Three Years of 
Humanitarian Intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Middle East Report No. 187/188 (March – June 1994), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012594.  
17 Eric Watkins, “The Unfolding U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” International Affairs 73, no. 1 
(January 1997): 3–4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2623547.  
18 See Alan Makovsky, “Kurdish Agreement Signals New U.S. Commitment,” The Washington 
Institute Policy Watch No. 341 (September 29, 1998), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/
view/kurdish-agreement-signals-new-u.s.-commitment;  Daniel Byman, et al., “The Rollback Fantasy,” 
Foreign Affairs 78, No.1 (Jan–Feb 1999), http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020237;  Also see Stephen J. 
Solarz, et al., “How to Overthrow Saddam,” a Foreign Affairs 78, No.2 (Mar-Apr 1999, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049265, for a series of letters to the editors of Foreign Affairs magazine in 
response to Byman, Pollack, and Rose. 
19 See Amin Tarzi, “Contradictions in U.S. Policy on Iraq and Its Consequences,” 27–32, 
http://www.rubincenter.org/meria/2000/03/tarzi.pdf; Leslie H. Gelb, “The Three-State Solution,” New York 
Times, November 25, 2003, http://www.cfr.org/world/three-state-solution/p6559; James Deneslow, “The 
Kurdish King Makers,” Al Jazeera English, 01 October 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/
2014/09/kurdish-kingmakers-2014930132452403344.html; Massoud Barzani, “A Kurdish Vision of Iraq,” 
Washington Post, October 26, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/25/
AR2005102501390.html.  
 7 
foreign policy discussions continued to present the Kurds as a potential solution to U.S. 
regional interests.20 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Operation Provide Comfort represented a seismic transformation in the American-
Iraqi Kurd relationship, where in the span of three years, the U.S. administration shifted 
from ignoring accusations of genocide to conducting direct military intervention to 
alleviate a humanitarian crisis. What had been a covert, selective relationship before 
Operation Provide Comfort became an overt partnership, shaped by the inherent promise 
of U.S. protection of the Iraqi Kurds in the decades after. Realist thinkers argue that the 
evolution of this relationship between the Iraqi Kurds and the United States reflected the 
American leadership’s calculations regarding the utility of the Kurds in U.S. regional 
goals. Liberal internationalists argue that the shifting relationship is the result of liberal 
democratic values gaining prominence in the international system at the end of the Cold 
War. Constructivists argue that the inconsistent relationship results from the changing 
definitions and understanding U.S. identity and interests, vis a vis the Iraqi Kurds.  
One possibility is that, rather than being exclusively the domain of one particular 
IR theory, the evolving relationship reflects the premises of several schools of thought, 
due in large part to the radically changing nature of the international system. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis employs qualitative methods to investigate the development of U.S. 
policy regarding the Iraqi state and its Kurdish citizens. Although IR theory provides 
several sources for state preference, as well as a number of potential actors regarding the 
                                                 
20 See Denise Natali, “Counting on the Kurds: The Peshmerga’s Prospects against ISIS,” Foreign 
Policy, 22 April 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-04-22/counting-kurds; 
Julian Pecquet, “Defense Bill Recognizes Iraq’s Kurdish, Sunni Militias as a ‘Country,’” 28 April 2015, 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/28/defense-bill-recognizes-iraqs-kurdish-sunni-militias-as-
a-country; Jeremy Diamond, “Rand Paul: Give the Kurds a Country,” http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/11/
politics/rand-paul-kurds-kurdistan-country/; Andrew Doran, “Recognize Kurdistan and Arm It, against ISIS 
in Northern Iraq,” http://www.nationalreview.com/article/418934/why-america-needs-kurdistan-andrew-
doran; and Jonathon Foreman, “Building the U.S.-Kurdistan Special Relationship,” Wall Street Journal, 10 
July 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-should-guarantee-kurdish-independence-1405020652#, 
among others. 
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creation and execution of foreign policy, this thesis focuses on the George H. W. Bush 
presidential administration as the principle, rational actor for analysis, because it was the 
Bush administration that chose and implemented Operation Provide Comfort as an 
American foreign policy action. Administration decisions regarding Operation Provide 
Comfort will be compared within the liberal internationalist, constructivist, and realist 
theoretical frameworks to determine which of these best explains the development and 
execution of the mission. 
Primary sources used include testimony and debate records of the U.S. Congress 
that provide insight into the mindset of key decision makers, in addition to news and 
scholarly journal articles to determine what, if any, policy debates were occurring within 
each period. Though using books written about the decision makers and the policy 
process risks relying on information that is self-serving, this body of work is used 
principally to determine potential choices and considerations presented to policy makers. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis argues that the evolving relationship between the United States and the 
Iraqi Kurds reflects how American leadership understands the nation’s interests, as well 
as its evolving roles and responsibilities in the international system. The remaining 
chapter layout is as follows: 
 
II. Brief History of Iraqi Kurds 
III. Review of Iraqi Kurds in U.S. Foreign Policy  
IV. IR Framework Analysis of Operation Provide Comfort  




II. BRIEF HISTORY OF IRAQI KURDS 
This chapter discusses the development of the Kurdish question in Iraq, from the 
creation of the Iraqi state until the period just prior to the First Gulf War. Elements within 
Iraq’s Kurdish population have sought an independent state since before the founding of 
Iraq, a struggle that has intensified and subsided depending on the outside support upon 
which the Kurds could rely. Iraq became a node of competition during the Cold War 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, with each of the Great Powers desiring 
to secure Iraq within its camp of partnered nations. This condition provided motivation 
for these outside powers to use Kurdish resistance in Iraq to their own ends. By the end of 
the Iran-Iraq War, however, the Kurdish plight in Iraq did not warrant sufficient attention 
from a global audience to move outside powers to act against allegations of genocide. 
Their condition seemed to confirm the adage that “the Kurds have no friends but the 
mountains.”21 
A. KURDS OF IRAQ  
The Kurds in Iraq are part of a greater Kurdish-speaking population that is spread 
across the shared borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria as a result of the treaties that 
formally ended hostilities after World War I. Distinguished from their Turkish and 
Arabic neighbors by language, and Persian neighbors primarily by religion, Kurds have 
sought an independent state within an envisioned Kurdistan region since the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire, but they have been thwarted in that effort by regional and Great Power 
interests.22 In addition, the Kurdish people are divided among themselves by geography, 
ideology, politics, and by the several dialects within the Kurdish language itself.23 Three 
main mountain ranges, the Zagros, the Eastern Taurus, and the Inner Taurus, form the 
geographical backbone of the home of the Kurds, or Kurdistan, from southeast Turkey 
                                                 
21 Michael Gunter, “The Kurdish Question in Perspective,” World Affairs 166, No. 4 (Spring 2004): 
197, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672696.  
22 David McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 8–13. 
23 Michael Gunter, The A to Z of the Kurds (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003), xxix. 
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through northern Iraq and western Iran (see Figure 1).24 Though primarily mountainous, 
the land also includes lush river basins and fertile, though isolated, plains.25 The region’s 
physical geography has traditionally supported robust agriculture and livestock breeding, 
though during the last century, rich oil deposits have also been a driver of economic 
vitality.26  
Figure 1.  Central Intelligence Agency Map of Kurdish Inhabited Area 
 
Source: “Kurdish Inhabited Area (U),” Library of Congress, last accessed Feb 19, 2014, 
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g7421e.ct002300/. 
                                                 
24 Wadie Jwaideh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development (New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 2006), 4. 
25 Ibid. 
26 McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, 6–7. 
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Kurdish have sought a Kurdish state since at least the end of the Ottoman Empire, 
though some tribes had considered leaving the Ottoman orbit at an earlier time.27 After 
defeat in World War I, the Ottoman Empire was dissected. The Allied victors devised the 
Treaty of Sevres to partition parts of the Ottoman Empire to various powers and interests, 
the foremost of which included France and Great Britain. Kurd hopes were buoyed by the 
text of the treaty, which called for the formation of an autonomous Kurdish area within 
six months, and provided for the possibility of forming an independent Kurdish state 
within a year.28 These hopes were never realized, however, since the treaty was never 
ratified. The breakout of war for Turkish Independence re-envisioned the borders within 
the former Ottoman Empire and codified those borders in the Treaty of Lausanne of 
1923. Unlike Sevres, Lausanne made no provisions for the Kurds or for the formation of 
a Kurdish state.29 Instead, the Treaty of Lausanne divided Kurdish populations across 
newly-formed state borders, which made Kurds an ethnic minority within Turkey, Iran, 
Syria, and Iraq, and gave each state incentive for suppressing ideas of Kurdish 
nationality. Any near-term hopes for Kurdish recognition, independence, or self-
determination would have to wait.   
B. KURDISH NATIONALIST RESISTANCE IN IRAQ  
Kurds in Iraq were an officially recognized group from the inception of the state. 
Due to the complex political composition of the Iraqi state, with a Shi’a majority and 
sizable Sunni and Kurdish populations, Iraqi elites devised a system of citizenship 
defined along civic, rather than ethnic lines, a system that left space for Kurdish 
identity.30 The 1922 Anglo–Iraqi Statement and the League of Nations mandate both 
recognized Iraq’s Kurds as having a claim to political status and rights as a group.31 
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Agreement on what that status entailed had not been reached, however, because Kurdish 
claims entailed cultural, some political, and—in a later period—economic, autonomy 
within disputed territory. London, Ankara, and the fledgling government in Baghdad each 
had incentive to deflect Kurdish nationalist claims for outright independence or greater 
autonomy. The British were interested maintaining a level of suzerainty over Mandate 
Iraq, and in controlling the Kurd-majority, oil-rich region of Mosul—a bounty that 
neighboring Turkey also coveted.32 Turkey had its own restive Kurdish population, 
which gave ample reason to oppose any Kurdish independence along its border with Iraq. 
On its part, the Iraqi government could not afford a sustained challenge to its legitimacy. 
In each case, Kurdish separatism in northern Iraq was a detriment to each group’s 
interests, and as a result, was actively suppressed.  
Kurds in Iraq were in periodic revolt against the government in Iraq for most of 
seven decades after 1919.33 At different times, both the British during the Mandate 
period and the government in Baghdad later made promises to the Iraqi Kurds for greater 
cultural and political autonomy in an effort to quell or co-opt resistance, only to rescind 
those promises when the British or central government position vis-à-vis the Kurds was 
strengthened enough to do so. During one such occasion, after the British had suppressed 
a second rebellion in northern Iraq by prominent Kurd leader Sheikh Mahmoud Barzinji, 
the British annulled their earlier promises to pursue a Kurdish government that were 
made in the Anglo–Iraqi Statement.34 Kurdish opportunities for independence from Iraq 
were dwindling. 
During the post-World War II period, Kurdish rebels sought to exploit a power 
vacuum in Iran to establish an independent Kurdish republic. Both Britain and the Soviet 
Union occupied Iran as part of the war in opposition to Iran’s pro-Germany leader, Reza 
Shah, who later fled.35 By 1946, the Soviets continued to occupy northern Iran, under 
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British and American protest, and it became clear that the Soviets desired a concession on 
oil production from Tehran. After gaining no traction toward receiving the sought after 
concession, the Soviets began to support separatists movements in northern Iran among 
Azeris and Kurds.36 Under encouragement by Soviet agents, Kurds in Iran declared the 
independence of the Republic of Mahabad in Western Iran in January 1946.37  
Kurds from northern Iraqi territory became an integral part of the Mahabad effort. 
The emergent leader of Iraqi Kurd resistance efforts, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, became 
part of the separatist endeavor in Iran in late 1945, when he and one thousand peshmerga 
fighters settled among Iran’s Kurds after fleeing a quelled rebellion in Iraq.38 The Soviets 
eventually succumbed to diplomatic pressure to leave Iran in December 1946, and with 
their exit they took what little support that the Kurds in Mahabad had relied upon.39 After 
the Iranians successfully subdued separatist elements in Mahabad, Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani fled to the Soviet Union with five hundred fighters, where he remained for 
twelve years until the overthrow of Iraq’s monarchy.40 Though the Mahabad Republic 
was a short-lived expression of Kurdish sovereignty goals, Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s 
involvement with the Soviet-supported project and his extended stay in the Soviet Union 
would shape American perceptions of Iraq’s Kurds during later years.  
1. The Iraqi–Kurdish War 
Political upheaval in Baghdad gave the Iraqi Kurds new opportunities to pursue 
their goals. When the Iraqi monarchy was overthrown in 1958, the new administration 
under President Qasim offered Mullah Mustafa Barzani clemency and invited him to 
return from the USSR. The Qasim administration oversaw the development of a 
provisional constitution that appeared to grant Kurds national recognition and ethnic 
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rights. The president also appointed Barzani as Baghdad’s recognized leader of the 
Kurds. For a period, Qasim and Barzani each seemed content to use the other in 
achieving their own objectives. Over the next several years, Qasim was able to use 
Barzani to quell several rebellions in Iraq’s north and central regions; in return, Barzani 
used Qasim to gain arms and to dominate his rivals among other Kurdish tribes that had 
used Barzani’s absence from Iraq to advantage. Supported by the Kurdish Democratic 
Party (KDP), Barzani consolidated power among Iraq’s Kurds and became a greater 
threat to Qasim’s rule; seeing this development, the worried Iraqi President shifted his 
allegiance away from Barzani and began to arm and equip the Kurdish tribes that Barzani 
had been fighting. By 1961, events had escalated to a full-scale Kurdish revolt, with the 
tribes loosely united under Barzani’s lead, though neither the Iraqi Kurds nor the 
government in Baghdad were able to gain a full victory.41 
Following years of rebellion, Kurdish autonomy seemed within reach. After 
suffering a number of setbacks, President Qasim was overthrown by a military coup in 
February 1963, giving the Kurds another opportunity to negotiate for autonomy. Once 
again, Mullah Mustafa used the disarray in Baghdad to consolidate his position amongst 
Iraq’s Kurdish tribes.42 For several years, the fighting ebbed and flowed. Government 
forces, weakened by subsequent coups, were not able to fully conquer Kurdish fighters, 
nor could the Kurds completely defeat the Iraqi military. In 1966, Iraqi Prime Minister 
Abd al Rahman Bazzaz offered the Kurds a sweeping plan that would provide autonomy 
and an end to the struggle; two years later, however, another Ba’athist coup would 
unravel the potential of Bazzaz’s work.43 In 1970, after the Iraqi army suffered several 
defeats at the hand of Barzani’s Kurdish rebels, Vice President Saddam Hussein 
negotiated a similar autonomy agreement in peace accord.44 Initially, both Baghdad and 
the rebel Kurds seemed to honor the agreement, but a year later, the initiative failed 
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because of disagreements regarding the borders of the Kurdish autonomous area, as well 
as the status of oil-rick Kirkuk.45 
Foreign interference both prolonged the Kurdish war and brought an abrupt end to 
it. In April 1972, Baghdad and Moscow signed the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, 
which ended tacit support that the USSR had provided to Barzani.46 Closer ties between 
Iraq and the Soviet Union stimulated the Nixon administration into agreeing to support 
the Iraqi Kurds covertly through Iran.47 Tehran intended to use the Kurds in Iraq as a 
bargaining chip against Baghdad, a gambit which ultimately payed off. In 1975, the Shah 
of Iran brokered the Algiers Accord, an agreement between Baghdad and Tehran that 
recognized Iranian claims regarding the Shatt-al-Arab waterway, in return for Iran 
discontinuing its support for the Barzani’s rebellion.48 Without support from Iran, Iraq’s 
Kurdish rebels were quickly overwhelmed and defeated, with many fleeing into Iran.49 In 
the aftermath of the 1975 defeat, Mullah Mustafa Barzani fled to the United States via 
Iran and later died in exile. Kurdish groups in Iraq disaggregated and formed new, 
weaker groups that were unable to credibly challenge Baghdad’s rule.50  
2. The Iran–Iraq War and the Anfal Campaign 
The eight year war between Iran-Iraq provided a new opportunity for Iraq’s Kurds 
to pursue concessions from Baghdad. Mullah Mustafa’s son, Massoud Barzani and the 
KDP, now based out of Iran, fought alongside Tehran’s forces, while Saddam Hussein 
enlisted Iranian Kurds to rise up against the regime in that country. The Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan (PUK), one group that splintered off from the KDP after the elder Barzani’s 
earlier defeat and exile, initially attempted to negotiate with Saddam Hussein for an 
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agreement on Kurdish autonomy, but ultimately joined the KDP forces in fighting 
Baghdad as part of a united Kurdish Front.51 
In response to Kurdish fighters assisting Iran and to deter further collusion, the 
Iraqi central government launched a series of punitive offensives into northern Iraq, what 
would later be known as the Anfal campaign. During the course of eight Anfal offensives 
starting in February 1988, many thousands of Kurds were forcibly removed from their 
homes, some to be executed, others to be relocated; twelve towns and thousands of 
villages were destroyed.52 Most of the Kurdish adult and teenage males disappeared after 
arrest by Iraqi forces. Iraqi forces used chemical weapons to subdue large swaths of the 
Kurdish countryside to devastating effect. In the town of Halabja alone, five thousand 
civilians were killed. Kurds fled to Turkey and Iran en masse.53 Kurds living in villages 
near Kirkuk were systematically killed in what appeared to be an attempt at full 
Arabization of the town and surrounding areas through ethnic cleansing.54 Saddam 
Hussein’s campaign appeared designed to finally answer Iraq’s Kurdish question in 
Baghdad’s favor. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Kurdish plight in Iraq had not yet eclipsed the importance of U.S. relations 
with Baghdad. Despite entreaties made to the international community and evidence 
trickling out of northern Iraq, Kurdish assertions of genocide brought little action from 
international actors. As a result of Iraqi chemical weapons attacks against Iran, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 620, which called for an immediate investigation into 
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reports of member states using “chemical, [biological], or toxic weapons,”55 but the 
Security Council did little to pursue reports use of Iraqi chemical weapons against the 
Iranians or the Kurds.56 The Reagan and Bush administrations were more inclined to 
normalize relations with Baghdad, and both successfully opposed the imposition of 
sanctions against Iraq as proposed by the U.S. Congress.57 International outcry did not 
translate into concrete international action. 
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III. REVIEW OF IRAQI KURDS IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
This chapter will discuss the place Iraq’s Kurds have held in U.S. foreign policy 
from the start of the Cold War into the current period. U.S. policy toward the Iraqi 
government defines, enables, and constrains U.S. decisions regarding Iraq’s domestic 
affairs. With this in mind, any U.S. policy that affects the Kurds in northern Iraq and the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is a subset of and a result of U.S. policy in Iraq. 
How American leadership views the opportunities and risks that Iraq presents to U.S. 
national goals, as well as how policy in Iraq can affect larger-scale U.S. strategic pursuits, 
greatly influences the choices that American leadership make with regard to relations 
with Iraq’s national government. 
After World War II and until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, American 
global foreign policy was shaped to compete with the Soviet Union. U.S. leadership was 
alarmed at the perceived threat that the Soviets posed, and the resultant choices to address 
this threat indelibly shaped American foreign policy throughout the world. Due to its 
location in the midst of the oil-rich Middle East, Iraq became one of the many fronts of 
the Cold War, with each side vying for regional influence and supremacy. During this 
period, American interactions with Iraq’s Kurds were intended to enable the United 
States’ to influence the region, maintain regional stability, and keep the central Iraqi 
government out of the Soviet sphere. American leadership’s perception of the Iraqi Kurds 
determined whether Kurds were engaged, opposed, or ignored in the United States’ 
policy toward Iraq.  
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 marked a schism in 
American foreign policy toward Iraq, from potential cooperation to outright war as the 
American-led coalition ousted Iraqi forces. After the First Gulf War, Kurds in the north 
and Shi’a in the south of Iraq began separate uprisings against Baghdad but each was 
swiftly and brutally suppressed by the Iraqi Republican Guard forces that had escaped the 
international coalition’s grasp during the war. In the north, an estimated 2 million of 
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Iraq’s Kurds fled to neighboring Turkey and Iran to escape Baghdad’s forces, creating a 
potential humanitarian disaster.58  
Although initially reluctant to get involved, the Bush administration eventually 
ordered a humanitarian relief mission, Operation Provide Comfort, to protect the Kurds 
from hostile forces and the natural elements while allowing the Kurds to return home. 
This action marked the beginning of a direct and overt relationship between the American 
government and Iraq’s Kurds, one that has been leveraged by both groups over the span 
of two decades in pursuit of each group’s objectives. Operation Provide Comfort was the 
catalyst for and enabler of American policy in Iraq from the Gulf War into the post-
Saddam Hussein era. 
A. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND IRAQ’S KURDS BEFORE THE 
FIRST GULF WAR 
The advent of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States had 
profound effects on American foreign policy. Despite an Allied victory over Germany 
and Japan in World War II, ideological and political differences between great powers 
quickly fractured the triumphant partnership. Perceived Russian support of Communist 
aggression within Turkey and Greece, coupled with Great Britain’s declaration that it 
would no longer provide aid to either country, prompted President Truman to announce 
American economic, financial, and political support to free, i.e., democratic, societies 
against totalitarian elements from within or without.59 This became known as the Truman 
Doctrine, and formed the basis of U.S. foreign policy against the enlargement of the 
Soviet Union and spread of Communist ideology. Three years later, the Truman 
administration authorized a military buildup as recommended by his advisers in National 
Security Council report 68 (NSC 68), and adopted a policy of containment to counter 
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Soviet expansion across the globe.60 One of the Containment policy’s envisioned borders 
was in the Middle East.  
A key facet of Containment policy in the Middle East was the so-called “Northern 
Tier,” consisting of states along the USSR’s southern borders that had friendly relations 
with the West.61 With access to critical oil reserves and operating bases for strategic 
bombers against the Soviet Union, the Middle East became one of several regions in 
which the Americans and Soviets maneuvered for influence.62 Soviet backing for Kurds 
in Iran during the Mahabad period supported American suspicions regarding Moscow’s 
intentions. In the months after the July 1958 Iraqi coup that overthrew the monarchy, the 
convergence of a reported Soviet-Iraqi arms agreement, the return of Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani from exile in the Soviet Union, and the new Iraqi administration’s growing 
reliance on the Iraqi Communist Party as a power base caused U.S. leadership worry 
about possible Soviet agitation in Iraq.63 In assessing the potential of Iraq becoming a 
Communist state, a CIA report encapsulated U.S. concerns: “Communist control of Iraq 
would establish the USSR in the heart of the Middle East … outflanking two U.S. allies, 
Turkey and Iran.”64 The Northern Tier would be penetrated, influence over strategic oil 
resources put at risk, and the U.S. policy of Containment would be breached.  
For the next decade, American administrations sought engagement with Baghdad 
to prevent Iraq from falling into the Communist orbit. The Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations were both concerned that instability in Iraq would lead to an opportunity 
that the Soviets could exploit and gain advantage. When Iraq’s Kurds attempted to gain 
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U.S. support in their fight against the central government, they were told that the United 
States considers the Kurdish Question in Iraq as an internal affair, and one in which 
American would not involve itself.65 Kurdish nationalism in Iraq might have spillover 
effects into Kurd populations in critical U.S. allies on the Northern Tier, Turkey and Iran. 
In addition, U.S. decision makers feared Mullah Mustafa Barzani, and by association, 
Iraq’s Kurds, had sympathies that lay in Moscow.66 At the time, Cold War considerations 
took precedent in American policy. 
Cold war considerations caused the United States to abandon its non-intervention 
policy regarding Iraq’s Kurds in 1972. Great Britain, whose interests in the region had 
necessitated London’s close involvement in local and regional affairs, had announced that 
it planned to withdraw from the Middle East at the end of 1971. Soon after the British 
withdrawal, the Iraqis and the Soviets signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that 
marked closer ties between the two nations, much to the dismay of the United States. In 
light of this treaty and the British departure, the Nixon administration sought to influence 
the regional balance of power in Washington’s favor by arming the Shah’s government in 
Iran. The Shah had already petitioned U.S. assistance in backing Iraq’s Kurds to 
destabilize Iraq, a request that the administration had previously rebuffed. The Iraqi 
government’s move in June 1972 to nationalize its oil industry, however, provided 
President Nixon yet another reason to interfere in Baghdad’s affairs.67  
In aiding Iraq’s Kurds, the United States was more interested in Cold War politics 
than in the Kurds’ quest for independence. As part of an effort to put pressure on the pro-
Soviet Baathist regime and draw it from Soviet orbit, the United States supported the 
Iraqi Kurds via the Iranian government over several years, but made clear that 
Washington had no desire for Barzani to declare a separate Kurdish state.68 The Kurds 
represented an opportunity to check the expansion of Soviet influence, but support for the 
nationalist cause was lukewarm. As hostilities reignited between the Kurds and Baghdad 
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in 1974, the U.S. State Department prepared to increase its level of covert support for the 
Kurds, but Washington was beginning to receive indications that the Shah was 
reconsidering his level of dedication to supporting Barzani’s efforts.69 After negotiations 
with Saddam Hussein in early 1975, the Shah rescinded his support for Iraq’s Kurds in 
exchange for settlement of borders issues around the Shatt-al-Arab waterway in Iran’s 
favor, a decision that also precluded U.S. support for Barzani.70 The United States’ brief 
and covert engagement with Iraq’s Kurds came to an abrupt end. 
During the next decade and a half, American interest in Iraq’s Kurds was 
minimal. In the fallout of Barzani’s defeat, the breakup of the KDP, the formation of the 
PUK, and Baghdad’s punitive campaigns against the Kurdish population were largely 
ignored in Washington policy circles. American Middle East policy objectives soon 
became eclipsed by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980. 
Still scarred from the ignominy of the 1979 U.S. Embassy takeover and hostage crisis in 
Tehran, the Reagan administration began to tilt its foreign policy toward supporting Iraq 
during the Iran-Iraq War.71 American policy makers took notice of the Iraqi Kurds’ 
choice to ally with Iran against Saddam Hussein, a choice which, in light of burgeoning 
American engagement with Baghdad, would cost the Kurds any potential support from 
the United States.72 
For the Reagan administration, regional stability in the Persian Gulf and 
containing Iran superseded humanitarian concerns with regard to Iraq’s Kurds. As reports 
began to surface regarding Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against the Kurds, both houses 
of the U.S. Congress condemned Iraq’s actions and attempted to pass sanctions against 
Iraq as punishment.73 The Reagan administration, and later that of George H. W. Bush, 
fought against any sanctions because they determined that punishing Saddam Hussein 
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would hurt U.S. initiatives in the Gulf region.74 In 1989, the National Security Council 
issued National Security Directive 26 (NSD 26) explicitly stating that “normal relations 
between the United States and Iraq would serve [the United States’] longer-term interests 
and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East.”75 In light of these 
considerations, the Iraqi Kurdish experience during the Anfal campaign, while tragic, did 
not warrant replacing American interests in the Middle East. 
B. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND IRAQ’S KURDS AFTER THE 
FIRST GULF WAR 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 served as the prelude to what would 
become a new era of engagement between American leadership and Iraq’s Kurds. After 
months of attempting to negotiate a return to the status quo prior to the invasion, the UN 
Security Council issued Resolution 678 in November, authorizing the use of force to 
remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait if those forces did not depart on their own by January 
15, 1991.76 The United States led a coalition of 39 UN member states that began 
airstrikes against Iraq on January 16.77 After six weeks of air strikes, coalition forces 
began a ground campaign that liberated Kuwait in four days and forced the remnants of 
Iraq’s invasion force to retreat to Basrah.78 A conditional cease-fire agreement was 
negotiated at the beginning of March, the terms of which were codified in United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 in April.79 It was a quick victory for the 
international coalition, but events after the war would keep the United States engaged in 
Iraq for years longer.  
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Though the coalition goal of ousting Iraqi forces from Kuwait was achieved, 
Saddam Hussein remained in power in Baghdad, a condition which the Kurds had been 
concerned about even before fighting began. Before and during the conflict, the KDP and 
the Kurdish front were unwilling to be seen allying with the West, and condemned the 
coalition attacks and agreed to stop Kurdish attacks on Iraqi military forces.80 The Kurds 
had reason to worry. Their experience during the Anfal campaign just three years earlier 
provided a potent example of the punishment that Saddam Hussein’s regime was willing 
to exact upon perceived traitors. Indeed, the Baathist’s ruling Revolutionary Command 
Council had issued a warning that explicitly stated Baghdad’s willingness to repeat 
Halabja.81 The Kurds would remain neutral through the brief course of the Gulf War. 
Before the ground campaign began, American leadership had tried to take 
advantage of the Kurds’ historical grievance against Baghdad to incite an overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein’s presidency. In a speech given on February 15th, President Bush 
seemed to appeal to the Kurds and other Iraqi opposition groups to topple the regime in 
Baghdad: “There’s another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military 
and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the 
dictator, to step aside.”82 Though President Bush and his National Security Adviser, 
Brent Scowcroft claim that there was no intention to incite any Iraqi populace other than 
the military establishment, Kurds in the north and Shi’a in the south began to rebel 
against a defeated Baghdad as cease-fire negotiations with the U.S. led coalition were in 
progress.83  
Battered and weakened after the war, Saddam Hussein’s military was still strong 
enough, however, to repress the two rebellions to the north and south. The cease-fire 
terms negotiated to end the Gulf War prohibited the Iraqis from using fixed-wing aircraft, 
but Baghdad’s negotiators were able to secure permission for the use of military 
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helicopters for humanitarian reasons.84 After containing the southern uprising within a 
matter of weeks, Saddam Hussein sent these helicopters northward to suppress the Kurds, 
along with fixed-wing aircraft and Republican Guard tanks and artillery that had 
managed to escape destruction during the war.85 Pockets of resistance fell quickly to the 
onslaught of government forces, and fears of Anfal-like attacks set hundreds of thousands 
of Kurds to flight for the borders. 
Initially, Baghdad’s treatment of the Kurds did not elicit punitive action for 
apparent cease-fire violations. The Bush administration’s preliminary response was to 
monitor the events but not to get involved in internal Iraqi politics. A week into Desert 
Storm’s air campaign, President Bush had stated that “we don’t want to see a destabilized 
Iraq when all this is over,”86 but the Kurdish uprising risked just that. U.S. policy, even 
during the war, was to preserve the territorial integrity and political unity of Iraq.87 For 
Mr. Bush at the time, it was not in U.S. national interests to support the Kurds against 
Saddam Hussein.  
 
Operation Provide Comfort 
As the number of Kurds fleeing government forces grew, the plight of the Iraq’s 
Kurds and a growing humanitarian disaster gained increased attention. Nearly a half-
million Iraqi Kurds fled to Turkey, with another 1.5 million fleeing to Iran.88 By early 
April, the Turkish government had closed its borders to additional refugees and was 
pressing its European and American allies to create a safe haven for the Kurds on the 
Iraqi side of the border.89 On April 5th, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 688, 
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which condemned Baghdad’s “repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of 
Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish-populated areas,” while demanding that Iraq 
“immediately end this repression” and allow international humanitarian aid organizations 
access to the region.90 For the first time in its history, the UN mentioned the Kurds in an 
international document,91 a considerable rise in stature for the Kurdish question. 
The United States was quick to support UNSCR 688 with action. On 7 April, the 
first U.S. airdrops of humanitarian supplies began into several large refugee camps in the 
mountains, an operation later dubbed “Provide Comfort.”92 On the same day that 
Operation Provide Comfort began, President Bush unilaterally created a no-fly zone 
above the 36th parallel in which any and all Iraqi aircraft were prohibited from 
operating.93 Though the creation of the no-fly zone was meant intended as force 
protection and to keep Iraqi air assets from hindering the aid effort, this no-fly zone 
would become a permanent feature of American policy toward Iraq for the next twelve 
years. In addition, President Bush’s declaration would later form a de facto boundary that 
allowed the formation of an autonomous Kurdish region within Iraq’s borders. 
On the basis of supporting UNSCR 688, Operation Provide Comfort quickly 
expanded from humanitarian aid into humanitarian intervention.94 Airdropped food and 
supplies couldn’t resolve the core issues facing the refugees, nor could it alleviate the 
Turkish government’s concerns of such a large contingent within and along its borders. 
President Bush directed American ground forces to enter northern Iraq to create a safe 
haven that would allow the Kurds to leave the mountain camps and return to their 
homes.95 By the end of April, an area safe from Iraqi military coercion had been secured, 
and Kurdish refugees began returning.96  
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Though international military personnel protected the humanitarian mission, 
Iraq’s Kurds and central government forces continued skirmishing and negotiating in the 
periphery. Given their perceived history of abandonment in the global political arena, and 
lacking any verbal or formalized commitment from the U.S.-led relief force regarding the 
longevity of the mission, the Iraqi Kurds tried to use the political space given by Provide 
Comfort to negotiate a better position vis-à-vis the central government. Consultations 
between both groups took place several times from April to July 1991, but no formal 
agreement was reached regarding the Kurdish political position within the state or the 
long-standing dispute over the status of Kirkuk. Both sides, however, considered the 
humanitarian mission to be a short-term event, with the Kurds worried about their 
condition after the coalition left, and the central government anticipating that very 
development.97 
The first phase of Provide Comfort was completed on July 24, 1991.98 The U.S.-
led effort succeeded in alleviating the immediate concerns of the humanitarian crisis and 
drew the Kurds from refuge in the mountains back into northern Iraq. The aid effort was 
turned over to the UN to manage, while the military footprint in the area was reduced. 
U.S. leadership was concerned that the Iraqi forces still maintained the capability to move 
northward against the Kurds again after any planned coalition withdrawal, so the no-fly 
zone was kept in place and a small security force was left on the Turkish side of the 
border as a deterrent.99 This transfer of management to the UN marked start of the 
second phase of Provide Comfort, a mission that would remain until December 1996. 
When talks between Baghdad and Kurdish groups failed to produce an agreement, 
Saddam Hussein placed the Kurdish region in northern Iraq under siege. In October 1991, 
as fights between the peshmerga and Iraqi military units threatened to collapse into open 
warfare, central government forces fully withdrew from the north, and government 
services and salaries for the Kurds were stopped. With all of Iraq under sanctions as a 
result of the Gulf War, the removal of services effectively put the Kurdish region under 
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double blockade. Saddam Hussein had expected the withdrawal of services through the 
harsh winter months would cause Kurdish groups to accept his terms, but Kurdish leaders 
instead took advantage of the political vacuum to create a Kurdish government body for 
the region.100  
Just over a year after Operation Provide Comfort began, Iraqi Kurds formed an 
autonomous regional government. In May 1992, the Kurdish Front, including both the 
KDP and the PUK, held elections for a governing assembly, and in June formed the 
KRG.101 Baghdad condemned the elections as treasonous plotting against Iraq’s 
territorial sovereignty.102 Neighboring states were uneasy with the emergence of any 
level of Kurdish autonomy, so the KRG tried to assure the international community, in 
particular the Turkish government, that the KRG was not seeking to create an 
independent state, but instead sought a democratic system within Iraq.103  
American leadership was initially concerned about how the formation of the KRG 
would impinge on regional stability.104 The KRG leadership’s efforts to reassure Turkey 
and the United States that the group’s objectives would not upturn regional stability were 
slowly gaining purchase.105 Soon after the election, the U.S. government did offer muted 
encouragement when a State Department representative stated that the United States 
“[welcomed] public and private assurances by the Iraqi Kurdish leadership [that the 
elections would deal] only with local administrative issues [and did not] represent a move 
towards separatism.”106 Stated U.S. policy in Iraq had remained unchanged: maintain the 
political integrity of Iraq and stability within the region, with or without Saddam Hussein. 
After the formation of the KRG, the Iraqi Kurds began to be included in U.S. 
policy considerations in Iraq. The Bush administration had made no secret of wanting 
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Saddam Hussein out of office, and after making an abortive attempt at an Iraqi military 
coup soon after the KRG elections, the administration instead decided to fund and 
covertly support the nascent Iraqi National Congress (INC) in its attempts to oust 
President Hussein. The INC was made up of a coalition of Iraqi opposition groups, 
including the KDP, the PUK, and various Shi’ite factions. The group’s platform seemed 
tailored to garner American support: compliance with UN resolutions, maintaining Iraqi 
territorial integrity, and support for a pluralistic and democratic Iraq. Because the Kurdish 
fighters and political parties formed the backbone of the group, American support for the 
INC translated to American support for Iraq’s Kurds.107 
Dual containment of Iraq and Iran became a central feature of American Middle 
East policy during the Clinton administration.108 In the portion of that policy directed at 
Baghdad, the intransigence of the Iraqi government in frustrating UN-directed weapons 
inspections—in accordance with UNSCR 687 that ended the Gulf War—made the INC 
connection, and hence the Iraqi Kurds, more valuable to American policy objectives. The 
utility of U.S. support for the INC was shattered, however, by a feud between the KDP 
and PUK that brought the Kurdish enclave and its government into civil war.109  
The KDP-PUK conflict nearly destroyed the KRG experiment and its protected 
status. The conflict opened in December 1993 with an attack on a KDP base, followed 
days later by fighting between the PUK and a smaller Kurdish group, the Islamic 
Movement of Kurdistan (IMK).110 The inability of either side to successfully address the 
unrest, or come to an agreement on the way forward, exacerbated long-held 
disagreements between the KDP and PUK. The resultant fighting between the groups left 
thousands dead and raged on for four years, and aggravated the widespread 
unemployment, rampant inflation, and soaring food prices already present in KRG 
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territory.111 In August 1996, over two years into the conflict, the KDP invited Saddam 
Hussein’s forces into the Kurdish region to help defeat PUK forces, sending American 
observers into disarray regarding how the United States’ response.112 In addition to 
punitive missile strikes against Iraqi positions in the south and expanding a no-fly zone 
created in the summer of 1992 to protect Shi’a populations from Baghdad’s repression, 
the U.S. State Department began Operation Pacific Haven, a mission to evacuate Kurds 
that had helped the U.S. effort in Iraqi Kurdistan.113 A series of three evacuations of over 
six thousand pro-U.S. Kurds and their families, many of which staffed U.S. funded 
humanitarian aid organizations, Pacific Haven seemed to signal an end to the Kurds being 
protected by the international coalition.114 Operation Provide Comfort ended on 
December 31, 1996, soon after the third evacuation was completed. 
The Kurds of Iraq continued to play a role in American foreign policy regarding 
Iraq after Provide Comfort ended. Despite the evacuations of Pacific Haven, the United 
States State Department continued to attempt to broker a peace agreement.115 In 
September 1998, peace was attained through the Washington Agreement, sponsored by 
the U.S. and agreed to by KDP and PUK leadership.116 One month later, President 
Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 into law, which specifically authorized the 
president to designate and support Iraqi opposition groups for the “replacement of the 
Saddam Hussein regime.”117 Saddam Hussein’s government continued to be a thorn in 
the side of the U.S. administration, thwarting UN-directed weapons inspections and U.S. 
efforts to isolate Iraq. The Iraq Liberation Act was a shift in U.S. policy on Iraq, a shift 
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that heavily benefited the Iraqi Kurds. In February 1999, President Clinton formally 
designated the INC, KDP, and PUK as one of seven Iraqi opposition groups eligible for 
U.S. support and funding.118 The Kurds’ and the KRG’s relationship with Washington, 
DC, had officially eclipsed U.S.-Baghdad relations, and the Iraqi Kurds were now 
recognized partners with the U.S. government. 
The interest in the Iraqi Kurd plight within American foreign policy has waxed 
and waned in conjunction with how well that plight aligned with American policy goals. 
As the American Global War on Terror began shifting focus from Afghanistan to Iraq, 
the Bush administration included the 1988 attack on the Kurds in Halabja as one of the 
justifications for the impending war,119 despite the lack of tangible U.S. response after 
the chemical attack. During the months just prior to the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 
2003, U.S. Special Forces units arrived and began operating from the Kurdistan Region 
of Iraq to support the invasion.120 As the war started, the Turkish government refused 
permission for the United States to launch invasion forces from Turkish soil, and as a 
result, the viability of the Iraqi Kurds as a willing and able partner gained importance.121 
After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA), the American authority put in place to temporarily govern Iraq, began to distance 
itself from full support of Kurdish goals. As the Iraqi Kurds consolidated and formalized 
the KRG position as an autonomous area in Iraq through the Transitional Authority Law 
(TAL) in 2004, CPA leadership sought to dismantle the KRG in order “to create an Iraq 
based on geographical units” rather than along ethnic or sectarian lines, and to strengthen 
the central government.122 For the United States, a unified Iraq remained the priority. 
During the drawdown of American forces in Iraq, the U.S. government remained 
involved in internal Iraqi politics, but KRG goals did not resonate as loudly with U.S. 
policy makers. 
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Regional destabilization and the rise of Islamic terrorists brought the Iraqi Kurds 
to the forefront of American policy once again. In the years after American withdrawal 
from Iraq, the growth and expansion of the militant group known as the Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham, also known as ISIS, captivated global audiences and seemingly 
confounded American policy makers regarding how to respond, if at all. In the midst of 
ISIS’ territorial conquest through much of Eastern Syria and Western Iraq, the Kurds 
were one of the few groups to successfully blunt the advance.123 With their success 
against ISIS, the Iraqi Kurds drew support from the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Ash 
Carter, as well as from several members of the U.S. Congress who seek to arm the Kurds 
directly rather than through Baghdad’s explicit consent.124 One U.S. presidential 
candidate argued that the Kurds should be given a state of their own.125 The status of the 
Iraqi Kurds in U.S. policy once again reflected the perceived utility of the Kurds in 
achieving American goals.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between the Iraqi Kurds and American foreign policy has been 
shaped largely by U.S. considerations of American goals on the local, regional, and 
global scales. When the United States was concerned with containment of the Soviet 
Union, Iraq’s Kurds were seen as a hindrance to American policy goals. As conditions 
changed and American goals shifted, Washington’s considerations of the Kurds followed 
suit. The post-Gulf War period and Operation Provide Comfort mark the start of a 
partnership between the U.S. government and Iraq’s Kurds, one which started informally 
but which later was codified in U.S. law.  
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While the Kurds in Iraq have been either employed or ignored to achieve 
American strategic goals, the Kurds have in turn leveraged the American partnership 
since Operation Provide Comfort to secure their own objectives. Using the political space 
provided during the humanitarian mission, the Iraqi Kurds formed the KRG and framed 
themselves as a willing, capable, and reliable ally for American aspirations. After the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, the emergence of ISIS provided the Kurds 
the opportunity to frame themselves as worthy of direct relations and potentially, of 
recognition as a de jure state. The Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq has blossomed 




IV. IR FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS OF OPERATION PROVIDE 
COMFORT 
This chapter applies the realist, liberal internationalist, and constructivist IR 
frameworks to the United States’ implementation of Operation Provide Comfort to 
determine which of the three most closely explains the George H. W. Bush 
administration’s decision to act. In addition, this chapter argues that American foreign 
policy decisions regarding the Iraqi Kurds reflected a blending of the three major IR 
theoretical frameworks, rather than adhering to one framework to the exclusion of the 
others. A liberal internationalist lens provides a compelling explanation of Bush 
administration policy, which emphasized the need to support UNSCR 688 and relieve an 
emergent humanitarian crisis. A constructivist lens argues that during the Gulf War, the 
United States developed an identity that was overtly hostile to Iraq’s central government, 
embodied by Saddam Hussein; this identity, along with public perception of American 
culpability regarding the repression of the Kurds after the war, helped inform U.S. policy 
decisions regarding the crisis. The realist lens contends that it was America’s concerns 
regarding regional stability and regional balance of power considerations that prompted 
the United States’ choice to conduct relief operations. 
A. POLITICAL CONTEXT OF OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT 
Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration focused considerable 
attention on managing affairs in Eastern Europe and in Germany. The Berlin Wall, the 
icon of Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, had come 
down less than a year before Iraq’s invasion, and the two superpowers were busy trying 
to reshape relationships over a European theater in tumult. Both powers were concerned 
over the nature of alliances, in particular where a potentially reunified Germany would be 
within the balance of power.126 The specter of political, social, and economic instability 
in Europe were some of the administration’s foremost concerns.  
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In the Middle East, the Bush administration was keenly focused on bringing the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to a close. Months before the Gulf crisis began, the Israeli Prime 
Minister had rejected the Bush administration’s proposed plan to shape peace talks, 
continuing the impasse between the parties involved.127 Prospects for resolution did not 
seem promising. During the Gulf crisis, the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s support 
for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War resulted in the group losing political and 
financial support from key Arab states that had supported the U.S.-led coalition.128 This 
change in the strategic environment opened an opportunity to commence peace talks 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis, which the administration in Washington, DC 
wanted to exploit. In light of the revived peace process, President Bush was wary of 
keeping U.S. troops stationed in the Middle East after the war because doing so would 
likely undermine U.S. credibility in the Arab–Israeli talks. 
Operation Provide Comfort was in effect through the remainder of the Bush 
presidency, during which time Germany unified as one nation, the Soviet Union 
collapsed into fifteen newly independent states, and the Balkans were awash in conflict as 
the former Yugoslavia ceased to exist. For the Bush administration, Iraq was but one hot 
spot among many, and Operation Provide Comfort just one expression of American 
foreign policy in what would soon become the post-Cold War world. 
B. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT WITHIN A LIBERAL 
INTERNATIONALIST FRAMEWORK 
During the buildup of coalition forces after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, President 
Bush chose to justify Operation Desert Shield (and later Operation Desert Storm as well) 
to the American public with the liberal-democratic language of rights.129 President Bush 
referred to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a rare opportunity to create “a new partnership of 
nations … a new world order” based on international cooperation in providing security, 
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freedom, and justice.130 Throughout American preparations for war, President Bush 
continued to emphasize the creation of “an international order, a common code and rule 
of law,” and he deferred American policy regarding the Iraqi invasion to UN authority.131 
While building coalition support, the American leadership’s rhetoric and action both 
seemed drawn from the liberal Internationalist approach.   
Although IR scholars have disagreed on the relative importance of separate facets 
of the American liberal internationalist framework, there is agreement that the theory’s 
foundation is drawn from President Woodrow Wilson’s approach to U.S. foreign 
policy.132 The fundamental characteristics of Wilson’s approach were the commitment to 
cooperative action in support of multilateral institutions to produce collective security in 
the international scene, the development of free markets, as well as the support of self-
determination for peoples around the world.133 After World War II, the liberal 
international framework evolved into a U.S. commitment to use American power to 
preserve international stability, but through cooperative mechanisms like the UN and the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO.134 As multilateral cooperation grew, 
liberal internationalism began to champion individual rights, while accepting greater 
responsibility for humanitarian protection.135 Operation Provide Comfort seemed to 
reflect many of these characteristics. 
President Bush celebrated Operation Desert Storm’s swift success in expelling 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait as a harbinger of a new level of international cooperation, and a 
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strengthening of the legitimacy of the UN Security Council in dealing with aggression.136 
After the war, Mr. Bush sought to “create shared security arrangements in the region,” 
while noting that “security does not come from military power alone.”137 Such was the 
context for American leadership when, soon after the war was over, the Kurdish refugee 
crisis emerged. 
The case for Operation Provide Comfort reflecting liberal Internationalist theory 
during the Bush administration is straightforward. As events developed in northern Iraq 
in March 1991, the Bush administration chose to play no part in the developing civil war, 
but when conditions worsened for Kurds fleeing the conflict and international consensus 
on the need to respond grew, President Bush agreed to provide humanitarian aid. U.S. 
action, however, came only after UNSCR 688, which appealed “to member states and to 
all humanitarian organizations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts,” was 
approved.138 Operation Provide Comfort was the continuance of President Bush’s liberal 
vision of strengthening international institutions and cooperation so that individuals, in 
this case the Iraqi Kurds, could “live in peace, free from oppression, free to live their 
lives.”139 
Operation Provide Comfort was intended to be a limited, emergency response to a 
humanitarian crisis. According to President Bush, the mission was “an interim measure 
designed to meet an immediate, penetrating humanitarian need.”140 The initial operation 
consisted only of airdrops of supplies, food and medicine. There was no intention to put 
U.S. ground troops into northern Iraq for an extended period in support of the mission; 
the American military drawdown from the Middle East was already in progress before 
the first flights in support of Provide Comfort were conducted on April 7, 1991.141 
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Military support was critical, however, to distribute aid and to provide access to the 
Kurds seeking refuge in the mountains.142 The intent of the military mission was to 
create conditions in which the UN and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
could take over control of the operations.143  
The coalition military presence was a show of force to facilitate humanitarian aid 
operations. The creation of the northern no-fly zone, one of the salient characteristics of 
American protection of the Iraqi Kurds for the following decade, was enacted unilaterally 
by President Bush in order to protect the humanitarian relief flights from being harassed 
or harmed in the process of distributing aid.144 For the first two weeks of aid distribution, 
the American military footprint on the ground in Iraq was limited to those units necessary 
to assess the situation and deliver needed supplies; most of the operation consisted of 
airdrops.145 As it became clear that efforts to reach the Kurds directly in the mountain 
camps was not sufficient to alleviate the crisis, U.S. leadership expanded the mission to 
include the use of ground troops to create a safe zone that encompassed beyond the 
refugee camps, and extended into the cities and towns that Kurds called home.146 
American military action was predicated on humanitarian concerns. Even U.S. military 
commanders saw their operational tasks in terms of the liberal international framework, 
the primary of which was to “stop the dying and suffering in the mountains.”147  
In line with the liberal internationalist framework, Operation Provide Comfort 
was an international mission, enabled by U.S. power, addressing humanitarian crisis, and 
legitimized by the foremost international institution, the UN. The Bush administration 
emphasized American efforts as part of an international coalition backed by UNSCR. In 
his announcement of the mission, President Bush argued that it was the UN that would 
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provide the long-term solution to the crisis.148 In mid-July 1991, the United States turned 
over its responsibility as lead entity for Provide Comfort to the UN, and majority of U.S. 
troops withdrew, leaving a no-fly zone in place, as well as a contingent of soldiers across 
the border in Turkey, both as a deterrent against Baghdad’s forces seeking retribution 
against the Kurds, and to monitor humanitarian assistance.149 The U.S. military operation 
supported the UN mission. 
The liberal internationalist framework does not adequately explain key features of 
the burgeoning relationship between Washington, DC and the soon-to-be-formed KRG. 
The elections that were held to form the KRG in May 1992 under Provide Comfort’s 
blanket of protection would seem to align neatly with the liberal international approach, 
but U.S. policy on Iraq exposed the limits of this view. The United States provided no 
support to facilitate the elections, and even the UN was reluctant to provide any 
assistance. 150Although American leadership was supportive of the democratic spirit 
being exhibited in northern Iraq, the U.S. policy remained clearly opposed to Kurdish 
independence, or any other condition that would undermine the sovereignty and political 
integrity of the Iraqi state.151 State Department officials signaled as much to the KRG, 
stating that the elected representatives “should deal only with local administrative 
issues.”152 While warning Saddam Hussein not to attack the Kurdish region, U.S. 
officials were clear to refer not to Kurds, but to “the people of Iraq,” a statement that 
made a clear political choice: Iraqi Kurds were Iraqi first.153 Despite liberal ideas 
regarding the right to self-determination, the United States could not condone outright 
secession. 
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Another facet of Provide Comfort not well explained by the liberal internationalist 
framework is the United States’ failure to protect the Kurdish region from Turkish (and 
later, also Iranian) military attacks. In response to the KRG elections, the Turkish military 
shelled the region.154 On multiple occasions throughout the life of the operation, the 
Turkish military launched offensives into the Kurdish region in Iraq. Although these 
Turkish operations in northern Iraq were ostensibly conducted to attack Turkish Kurds 
associated with the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a separatist group that had been 
using the Iraqi safe haven as a base of operations, there were accusations that attacks 
were targeting and killing Iraqi Kurdish civilians,155 and razing Iraqi Kurdish villages.156 
U.S. leadership did little to oppose these operations and may have understood them to be 
the price of basing Provide Comfort forces in southern Turkey. 
Lastly, the liberal internationalist framework does not explain the difference in aid 
to the Kurdish refugee camps along the Iranian and Turkish borders. Though there were 
an estimated three times as many Iraqi Kurds seeking refuge in Iran than in Turkey, the 
Iranian camps received less than half the international aid provided to the Turkish 
ones.157 U.S. funds to aid Iranian camps were one-tenth the level of funds provided to 
camps in Turkey.158 Donor governments, the United States included, were directing aid 
to particular villages and projects instead of across the fleeing Kurdish population as a 
whole, a practice that seemed more concerned with media visibility than with the welfare 
of the Kurds.159 
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C. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT WITHIN A CONSTRUCTIVIST 
FRAMEWORK 
The argument for Provide Comfort as a constructivist case rests in understanding 
the identities that the Bush administration espoused for the United States vis á vis the 
world community, the Iraqi Kurds, and Saddam Hussein. The foundational precept of the 
constructivist argument is that actors (whether individual or collective) act toward one 
another on the basis of the meaning that each has attached to the other.160 In other words, 
states treat friends and enemies differently because enemies pose a threat while friends do 
not.161 Through the process of interaction, actors develop identities: socially constructed 
understandings that assign meaning to the interaction, and shape understanding of one’s 
roles, responsibilities, and interests.162 An actor’s identity comes attached with specific 
standards of behavior for what is appropriate, or norms.163 During the buildup for the war 
and afterward, the Bush administration constructed identities that were each associated 
with normative expectations with how the United States should act, which then informed 
how the Bush administration did act. 
During the Gulf Crisis, the Bush administration sought to vilify Saddam Hussein 
to delegitimize the Iraqi leader’s actions while justifying the course of action that the 
United States was pursuing. In the president’s announcement of war against Iraq, Saddam 
Hussein was depicted as a cruel, callous warmonger who “systematically raped, pillaged, 
and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own … [and] maimed and murdered, 
innocent children.”164 Mr. Bush continued on claiming that Saddam Hussein met every 
overture for peaceful resolution of the crisis with contempt, threats, and defiance. In 
contrast, the United States stood opposed to Mr. Hussein’s defiant belligerence, 
conducting a mission supported by the world community.165 The contrast between the 
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normative roles that the Bush administration was asserting served as a mobilizing 
ideology for war support, and could not be clearer: Saddam Hussein was “a monstrous 
criminal, [while the United States was] the embodiment of justice.”166 
In another normative claim, President Bush framed America’s identity as part of a 
free and democratic West. In this capacity, the United States was part of the new world 
order which held the principles of freedom, democracy, and individual rights in high 
esteem.167 In contrast, the Iraqi regime was portrayed as having a disregard for human 
life, and was suspected to have conducted chemical attacks on its own citizens. These 
stark identities, as drawn upon by the Bush administration to gain public support for the 
war effort, shaped the discourse on U.S. inaction as Baghdad was suppressing the 
rebellions to the north and south. 
International press coverage of Iraqi forces attacking fleeing Kurds in the north 
shaped perceptions of the Kurds as victims. Journalists reported the horrors and showed 
the images of phosphorous bomb attacks, of people being killed indiscriminately, and of 
the cruelty of the Iraqi army, as well as the intransigence of Turkish border guards to the 
Kurdish plight.168 The Bush administration was criticized for not continuing the war 
effort long enough to destroy the Iraqi army’s ability to mount such attacks; many 
thought that the United States simply chose not to finish the job.169 The failure to destroy 
the Iraqi war machine was compounded by the failure to protect the Kurds from the 
onslaught, a condition which soiled the United States’ reputation as a Western state 
espousing liberal principles. Some observers also held the Bush administration 
responsible for the uprisings themselves, when he implored the Iraqi people to take 
matters into their own hands. Jalal Talabani, leader of the PUK, voiced this sentiment 
when he publicly appealed to President Bush, saying “You personally called upon the 
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Iraqi people to rise up against Saddam Hussein’s brutal dictatorship.”170  The Kurds were 
victims, and because the coalition led by the United States was partly to blame, the 
United States needed to take part to fix the problem. Flooded by media coverage that 
relayed “images of a human tide, cowering in the mountains, without food, water, shelter 
or sanitation near the closed Turkish borders,” American public opinion shifted from 
expectations of a post-war draw down to signaling overwhelming support for a sustained 
military presence in Iraq to help protect the Kurds.171 
As international and domestic expectations mounted for something to be done to 
assist the Kurdish refugees, the Bush administration agreed to provide aid. President 
Bush, when clarifying his reasons for ordering the U.S. military to take part in Provide 
Comfort, succinctly stated the White House position: “we simply could not allow 
500,000 to a million people to die up there in the mountains.”172 This statement reflects a 
perceived responsibility to act, a perception that constructivists would argue was defined 
and informed by the relationships between American leadership and the various 
interested parties. Although delayed, the United States and its allies did protect the Kurds 
from Baghdad’s forces, and a more extensive human tragedy was avoided. 
Unlike the liberal internationalist theory, the constructivist framework does 
explain the difference in aid that the United States provided to the refugee groups. 
Though the humanitarian aid was ultimately intended to alleviate Kurdish suffering, the 
aid was also meant to assist recipient governments to do the work. U.S. relations with 
Iran were more acrimonious than those with NATO ally, Turkey. The constructivist 
framework would argue that Turkey would, not unexpectedly, find more U.S. assistance 
in dealing with problems than Iran would.  
Like the liberal international one, the constructivist framework’s lacks a 
convincing explanation for other U.S. policy choices associated with Provide Comfort. 
                                                 
170 As cited in Meho, Documentary Sourcebook, 5, from an International Herald Tribune article, 
“United States Turns Down Plea to Intervene as Kirkuk falls,” March 30, 1991.  
171 James Cockayne and David M. Malone, “Creeping Unilateralism: How Operation Provide Comfort 
and the No-Fly Zones in 1991 and 1992 Paved the Way for the Iraq Crisis of 2003,” Security Dialogue 37, 
no. 1 (March 2006): 125, DOI: 10.1177/0967010606064138.  
172 As cited in Gunter, Kurds of Iraq, 57. 
 45 
The activation of the identities of the Iraqi Kurds as victims and the United States as their 
protector would not seem to have space for the selective response to Kurdish protection, 
but Turkish and Iranian attacks within the Kurdish region were tolerated. Likewise, the 
lack of U.S. support for KRG elections, juxtaposed against a repressive and brutal regime 
in Baghdad, seems out of step as a nation that identifies and supports liberal Western 
values and norms.  
Although the constructivist framework provides a suitable explanation of where 
policy preferences regarding Provide Comfort originated, it does not explain any type of 
precedence between policy options. Constructivists might argue that the American-KRG-
Baghdad relationship had a different context than the American-KRG-Turkish or 
American-KRG-Iranian relationships, contributing to differing responses to similar 
conditions. While the different relational contexts are indeed apparent, this argument 
produces questions regarding which relationship is more important than the others in U.S. 
foreign policy decisions, and in what contexts. The framework leaves those questions 
unsatisfyingly unanswered.  
D. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT WITHIN A REALIST 
FRAMEWORK 
The basis for Operation Provide Comfort as a realist173 enterprise is that the 
mission was conducted to preserve a regional balance of power and in pursuit of national 
interests. Realist theory assumes that the international system is characterized by anarchy, 
a system that is populated by states as the principal actors, each of which is concerned 
primarily with survival and security, and unable to rely on other states to achieve either 
one.174 Instead, states must rely on helping themselves in achieving and maintaining 
survival.175 Within the international system, states form alliances with other states to 
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establish and maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the state and allows it 
the ability to pursue its interests.176  
For defensive realists, a state’s primary national interest is security; how the state 
pursues that interest varies widely.177 For offensive realists, the pursuit of security is 
defined as an impulse to amass power to a level that permits domination of the regional 
system, and prevents challengers from threatening state security.178 One expression of a 
state’s power is its ability to project and use military force to ensure its security, making 
economic strength to produce that military power a vital national interest.179 
At the end of the Gulf War, realist concerns regarding regional stability and 
national interests kept the United States from intervening on behalf of the Kurdish and 
Shi’a uprisings. President Bush wanted to bring U.S. forces home as quickly as possible, 
but getting involved in internal Iraqi politics would only hinder that goal. The Shi’a and 
Kurdish uprisings, though a welcome opportunity to have Saddam Hussein removed from 
power, also risked partitioning Iraq, or possibly inviting the Turkish and Iranian militaries 
into the fray.180 Any outbreak of a greater conflict would pose an additional risk to what 
sitting Secretary of State James Baker called the economic lifeline of the West: access to 
oil in the Middle East.181 In addition, the Bush administration hoped to follow the victory 
in Desert Storm with a rapid withdrawal of forces in an effort to build the growing trust 
that Arab allies had of the United States. Mr. Bush hoped to leverage that trust to make 
headway in the Middle East peace process.182 With the exception of the potential 
removal of Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration did not have an interest in helping 
the uprisings succeed.  
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The lack of initial U.S. response to the plight of the fleeing Kurdish refugees was 
a continuation of this realist approach to post-war Iraq. Before the war, NSD 26 had 
already laid out the Bush administration’s policy choice of seeking normalized and 
economically beneficial relations with the government in Baghdad, despite the awareness 
of Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign against the Kurds. After the war, despite ceasefire 
agreements to the contrary, a senior Pentagon official indicated a willingness to allow 
Saddam Hussein to use Iraqi planes to put down the rebellions “as long as [Iraqi aircraft] 
did not threaten allied forces.”183 American leaders were willing to overlook an emerging 
human crisis in order to “leave Baghdad enough power to survive as a threat to … 
Iran,”184 while also avoiding a greater conflagration from the breakup of Iraq. 
The case for Provide Comfort as a realist policy prescription lies in the wording of 
UNSCR 688.  Although the Security Council passed UNSCR 688 in response to a 
humanitarian crisis, it cited the flow of Kurdish refugees as a threat to “international 
peace and security in the region” as the issue to be addressed.185 The massive influx of 
Kurds fleeing the Iraqi military threatened to destabilize NATO ally, Turkey, and 
undermine Turkish efforts against the PKK.186 In addition, the Bush administration was 
concerned with a possible large Turkish military response that might further destabilize 
the region.187 It was this threat to regional stability that finally helped French and Turkish 
representatives to convince the Bush administration to get involved at the UN level. Once 
undertaken, Operation Provide Comfort seems to address U.S. and Turkish stability 
concerns. 
The realist framework does account for the disparity in aid provided to refugee 
populations along the Iranian and Turkish borders. Provide Comfort was meant to 
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address stability concerns in Turkey, not Iran, so the bulk of U.S. aid was provided in 
Ankara’s direction. From the Bush administration’s perspective, instability in Iran may 
have brought about a welcome change within a regime hostile to the United States. 
The realist framework addresses the other weaknesses in the liberal 
internationalist and constructivist explanations of Provide Comfort. The United States 
tolerated Turkish attacks into northern Iraq because, in realist terms, Provide Comfort 
was intended to preserve the regional balance of power and stability. If that goal required 
the Turkish military to conduct limited operations against alleged terrorist camps to 
maintain Turkish domestic stability, so be it. Likewise, the Bush administration’s 
distancing itself from the KRG elections can explained in realist terms. The election 
threatened to undermine the Iraqi state and destabilize the regional balance of power, a 
condition counter to what the Bush administration hoped to preserve. 
Provide Comfort as a realist policy action is incomplete. Rather than addressing 
the normative aspects of Provide Comfort, the realist framework dismisses them in favor 
of balance of power considerations. It is difficult to ignore, however, that the Bush 
administration sought to legitimize the operation at the UN Security council, and that the 
bulk of the mission was later turned over to the UN, a non-state actor. The realist 
framework is also silent regarding the development of a de facto partnership between the 
American government and the Iraqi Kurds, a sub-state actor, a condition more directly 
addressed in the other two theoretical frameworks.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Characterizing Operation Provide Comfort as a policy decision solely within one 
theoretical framework would be incomplete: the normative, humanitarian concerns of the 
mission cannot be ignored, nor can the concerns regarding the system-level effects of the 
refugee crisis on the geopolitical environment. Having asserted the United States’ identity 
during the Gulf Crisis as the protector of the weak and helpless (i.e., the Kuwaitis), the 
Bush administration clearly felt some domestic and international pressure to protect 
another weak group, the Kurds, against the same villain that the United States had just 
defeated. The administration was also forced to respond to criticism for not finishing the 
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Gulf War, and for allowing the Iraqi army to brutalize the Kurds. President Bush did seek 
legitimacy for the mission at the UN Security Council, and did turn the mission over to 
the UN once security conditions on the ground permitted. And, even prior to the Gulf 
War, the White House was clearly concerned about regional stability, as well as with 
keeping Iran from capitalizing on the post-war developments. The manner in which the 
Bush administration executed Operation Provide Comfort displays the confluence of 
liberal internationalist, constructivist, and realist frameworks in the policy decision, 
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The American decision to protect the Iraqi Kurds in April 1991 exposes the risks 
of seeking immediate answers to pressing, current issues at the expense of longer-term 
strategic goals. Whether the Bush administration conducted Operation Provide Comfort 
to come to the defense of human rights and reduce human suffering, protect a minority 
group against brutal persecution, or maintain regional stability, the White House sought a 
solution to the problem on a tactical level that ran in direct opposition to policy goals on 
the strategic level. Despite not wanting to become embroiled in the political dispute 
between the Iraqi Kurds and the central government, the White House did exactly that, 
and did so in a manner that made sense when addressing the refugee crisis. Operation 
Provide Comfort was the first expression of an overt, de facto partnership between U.S. 
government and the KRG, a relationship that has served to undermine the U.S. 
commitment to Iraqi territorial integrity, sovereignty, and authority.   
Operation Provide Comfort indelibly shaped U.S. actions in Iraq after the Gulf 
War. The U.S. military post-war draw down was disrupted in order to distribute aid and 
protect the civilian Kurdish population, and U.S. forces remained directly engaged in the 
region in a way that the Bush administration had hoped to avoid. The policy of protecting 
the Kurds evolved into a relationship in which American leadership saw the Kurds as 
reliable partners in achieving U.S. policy goals in Iraq. Although the Clinton 
administration formally ended the humanitarian facet of Operation Provide Comfort in 
December 1996, it maintained the no-fly zone mechanism under the name Operation 
Northern Watch. U.S. patrols of the no-fly zones continued to serve as an enforcement 
tool until the American invasion in 2003. 
The Bush administration expected Operation Provide Comfort to be a mission of 
limited duration, conducted to address a limited condition, and executed with limited 
strategic effects, but the White House never defined a limit for the enterprise. Without 
distinct mission completion criteria and an exit strategy for the military, U.S. motivations 
to remain involved in northern Iraq were perpetual in all three IR theoretical frameworks, 
until either Saddam Hussein was removed from power, or the relationship between 
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Baghdad and the Kurds was redefined. Both of these events occurred after the 2003 
invasion.  
Operation Provide Comfort hindered domestic diplomacy between the KRG and 
Baghdad, which prolonged the need for U.S. forces in the area. Despite not wanting to 
become involved in domestic Iraqi politics, the Bush administration did just that by 
declaring an arbitrary border north of the 36th parallel, a border defended by American 
military power. Any agreements Baghdad made with the KRG would have been under 
threat of foreign military intervention, requiring continual enforcement by outside 
powers. A political solution for the Kurdish question in Iraq was no more likely during 
Provide Comfort than before it. 
Within the liberal internationalist framework, the primary motivation for U.S. 
involvement was to provide humanitarian aid and prevent human rights violations. In the 
absence of coalition intervention, the threat of Iraqi forces exacting punishment upon the 
Kurds was evident, particularly in light of the Anfal campaign three years earlier. A 
military deterrent was necessary to address the threat, unless the Iraqi Kurds could reach 
an amicable political settlement of their ongoing dispute with Baghdad. Saddam Hussein 
had little incentive to offer concessions to the Kurds, particularly in light of the Bush 
administration’s unwillingness to remove him from power militarily.  
Likewise, the constructivist motivations for assisting Iraqi Kurds were not 
addressed by the mission. The threat of the brutal dictator victimizing the Kurds 
continued, requiring the United States forces to remain in the area to protect them. 
International sanctions and Saddam Hussein’s seeming defiance of UN weapons 
inspections further complicated the relationships between Washington, Erbil, and 
Bagdad. The White House refused to negotiate with Saddam Hussein’s government on 
any subject while Washington considered Baghdad in violation of cease fire 
requirements, which meant no opportunity to broker a political solution to the Kurdish 
plight. Operation Provide Comfort did nothing to resolve the conflict inherent in the 
identities and relationships between Washington, Baghdad, and Erbil, and in turn that 
conflict of identities continued to simmer throughout the period that the mission was in 
force.  
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The regional stability and balance of power concerns that Operation Provide 
Comfort addressed within the realist framework did not vanish as a result of the mission. 
For the reasons already discussed, the possibility of a similar refugee condition occurring 
again after a U.S. departure was high. Since the Bush administration avoided seeking 
remedies to the underlying political issues and remained unwilling to accept the 
consequences of departure, the mission continued. 
The duration of Operation Provide Comfort and the nature of enforcement 
undermined coalition support for the mission. Though initially the no-fly zones were 
patrolled by French, British, and American aircraft, by late 1996 the French government 
decided to rescind its support for the military mission. International criticism mounted 
regarding questions on legality of the no-fly zones and the imposition on the sovereignty 
of a UN member state. What legitimacy the mission held was put into question when the 
KDP invited Iraqi forces into the Kurdish region to defeat the PUK. When the Clinton 
administration ordered punitive strikes and expanded the southern no-fly zone in 
response to the Iraqi military presence in the north, U.S. protection of the Kurds was 
reduced to caricature.  
In the absence of a defined exit plan, the duration of Operation Provide Comfort 
caused the mission to evolve beyond the scope of humanitarian assistance. Due to the 
time-sensitive nature of the refugee crisis, U.S. policy surrounding Operation Provide 
Comfort was formulated in an ad hoc manner that helped justify an incremental 
expansion of the mission. The inhospitable terrain where the refugee camps were located 
necessitated the air drop of relief supplies, which in turn justified (in the Bush 
administration view) the creation of a no-fly zone to protect the aircraft. That protection 
was later transferred to ground troops in the affected region who were later distributing 
aid. Alleviating the humanitarian crisis on the ground required protecting the Kurds and 
enticing them to return to their homes, a protection that developed into a full partnership 
and provided the political space to allow Iraqi Kurdish nationalism to achieve its signal 
expression in the formation of the KRG. As Operation Provide Comfort continued, the 
aid that flowed to the Iraqi Kurds strengthened the KRG’s power vis á vis Baghdad and 
increased the pressure that the Kurds could exert on the state in their quest for autonomy.  
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The duration of Operation Provide Comfort reinforced the relationships formed 
between the White House and the KRG. Though it was no secret that President Bush 
desired an overthrow of Saddam Hussein, his administration never overtly moved to 
achieve that end. Nonetheless, the antagonism between governments gave the White 
House an affinity for the Kurds that was not there during the period of the Anfal 
campaign. The Clinton administration’s policy of dual containment built on this hostility 
toward Baghdad and openly sought to use the Kurds as agents of regime change. Thus a 
relationship that began with the United States as protector of the Kurdish victims became 
a covert, but full-fledged, partnership that remained in a de facto status until the Iraq 
Liberation Act. As a result of this growing relationship, the United States has shown itself 
willing to expend blood, treasure, and political capital to avoid the appearance of failing 
the mission to protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein.  
U.S. support for the Kurds continues to complicate the internal political dispute in 
Iraq. At the present time, as it was during the period that began Operation Provide 
Comfort, the desire to see tactical and operational level results is eclipsing strategic level 
criticism for the current course of action. ISIS has emerged as the new villain to replace 
Saddam Hussein as the Kurds’ tormentor, a villain that the United States has declared an 
interest in thwarting. The peshmerga’s success in staving off a rout of KRG-held areas 
has once again brought the American-Iraqi Kurd relationship to the forefront of U.S. 
policy discussion. Decision makers in Washington want to empower and arm the Kurds 
in Iraq, as well as those in Syria, in the fight against ISIS, against the expressed desires of 
the respective central governments. Doing so, however, would also serve to strengthen 
the separatist ambitions within the Kurdish groups. The underlying political objectives of 
the Iraqi Kurds have not changed, nor has the Iraqi, Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian 
opposition to an independent Kurdish polity in the region. American involvement has 
implications in not only the fighting in Iraq, but also the Syrian civil war. 
The U.S.–Iraqi Kurd relationship threatens to reduce U.S. regional influence. 
Despite central government opposition, American leadership has continued to partner 
with sub-state entities in the struggle against ISIS, with seeming little regard to the 
incremental political claims that are being undertaken at the expense of other U.S. policy 
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aims. U.S. forces have entered into agreements with Syrian Kurds for the use of airfields 
in territory under their control to facilitate the U.S. air campaign against ISIS.188 
Likewise, following victories of ISIS forces, KRG militias have seized control of territory 
whose status had long been disputed with Baghdad.189 Though the U.S. government has 
repeatedly expressed a desire to avoid becoming entangled in answering the Kurdish 
question in Iraq, it is apparent that U.S. action has made the United States a participant in 
the argument. In response, the Iraqi and Syrian governments may seek closer ties to other 
powers, including Iran and Russia, to offset U.S. support for their rivals. American 
support for Kurdish groups would likely put further strain on the relationship with the 
Turkish government as well.  
As in the post-Gulf War period, U.S. leadership is once again presented with the 
question of what to do about U.S. involvement with the Iraqi (and Syrian) Kurds. Present 
American policy threatens to maintain the U.S. government as an unwitting and unwilling 
actor in the ongoing dispute regarding the status of the Kurds. With U.S. assistance, 
Kurdish groups have the potential emerge from the conflict with ISIS and the Syrian civil 
war stronger than when they entered, with the fundamental political quarrel with their 
respective states still intact, and allegiance to the central government at its nadir. 
American foreign policy must seek to diplomatically engage, rather than ignore by the 
exercise of force, the underlying issues that threaten to embroil the region in widespread 
conflict once again.  
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